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The First International Merger Wave
(and the Fifth and Last U.S. Wave)
BERNARD S. BLACK*
ABSTRACT
This article presents international evidence on takeover activity,
and uses that evidence to argue that the current takeover wave can
fairly be called the first-ever international merger wave, as much or
more than it can be called the fifth U.S. merger wave. I also discuss
the factors that contribute to the strength of the current takeover wave
and why the takeover boom has engendered so little political concern.
Mergers & acquisitions (M&A) activity seems to come in waves.
As Joseph Flom documents in the lead article for this conference, we are
in the middle of a major takeover wave, with announced U.S. takeovers
at a record $1.8 trillion in 1999 and announced worldwide takeovers at a
record $4.4 trillion.' A billion-dollar deal is now small potatoes - there
were almost 200 acquisitions over this size last year in the United States
alone.
The current wave is considered the fifth U.S. takeover wave of the
twentieth century. In fact, however, it makes increasingly less sense to
see takeover booms and busts as national phenomena. The current wave
can be considered, at least as accurately, to be the first truly international
takeover wave. Conversely, the current wave will likely be the last that
can be considered, even crudely, a U.S. wave. A growing percentage of
takeovers are cross-border; major stock markets are increasingly linked;
and U.S.-only takeover activity in 1999 was only about 40% of the
worldwide total measured by transaction value, and 30% measured by
number of transactions.
I also speculate on some questions raised by the current frenzy of
merger activity: why now, why so much, and how long will the wave
last? One reason for why so much: the political climate for takeovers is
as favorable, along many dimensions, as we have seen for a long time.
The current merger wave will surely end, perhaps when it is killed by a
stock market crash. But it will not end because it was sabotaged by a
political counterattack.
* Stanford Law School, John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics.
1. Joseph H. Flom, Mergers and Acquisitions: The Decade in Review, 54 U. MiAMi L. Rav.
753 (2000). Flom reports somewhat lower numbers than I do because his data is based on
completed transactions, rather than announced transactions.
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I. THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL MERGER WAVE
A. Characteristics of the Current Takeover Wave
The current takeover wave (call it 1993-present) can be called the
fifth in U.S. history. The first four waves, with rough dates, were:2
• 1895-1903: The creation of the great oil, steel, and other trusts, some-
times called the "merging for monopoly" wave.
• 1920-1929: Consolidation in many industries, sometimes called the
"merging for oligopoly" wave.
• 1960-1973: Emergence of conglomerate firms and other diversifying
acquisitions, sometimes called the "conglomerate merger" wave.
* 1978-1989: The fourth wave isn't neatly captured in a single phrase,
but included large components of hostile takeovers, bust-up and refocus-
ing of conglomerate firms, and leveraged buyouts.
These four waves can fairly be called U.S. takeover waves. Per-
haps comparable takeover booms occurred in other countries at about
the same times (or at other times), but if so, no scholar has mentioned
this, to my knowledge. Cross-border transactions were a distinct minor-
ity. We do not know what proportion U.S. takeover activity was of the
world total during the prior waves - no one kept good international
data. But the failure to collect data is telling - apparently there was not
enough activity to justify collecting it.
In contrast, the current wave has a distinctly international flavor.
Many of the signature transactions - including Daimler's acquisition of
Chrysler to form DaimlerChrysler and Vodafone's acquisition of Man-
nesmann - were either entirely outside the United States or involved a
non-U.S. party. The $180 billion Vodafone-Mannesmann transaction,
between two non-U.S. firms, is the largest in history. Autos, telecoms,
telecom and Internet equipment, airlines, oil, and metals (notably copper
and aluminum) are examples of industries where worldwide consolida-
tion is driving intensive takeover activity. In banking, the mergers
mostly remain domestic (perhaps because banking is highly regulated),
but domestic consolidation is increasingly driven by international
competition.
European takeover activity, fueled by the adoption of a true single
market with a single currency, has soared to $630 billion in announced
transactions in 1998 and $1.6 trillion in 1999. It would not surprise me
if European takeovers in 2000 exceeded U.S. takeovers in dollar volume
- probably for the first time ever.
Writ broad, the increasingly international flavor of takeovers is an
2. For expanded discussion of the first four waves, see RONALD J. GiLSON & BERNARD S.
BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE AcQuIsrrIONS ch. 1 (2d ed. 1995 & Supp. 2000).
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inevitable accompaniment to the international growth of securities mar-
kets. The U.S. economy is a shrinking portion of the world economy
and the U.S. stock market, as strong as it has been, is a shrinking part of
the world market, measured by market capitalization. No surprise, then,
that U.S. takeovers are a shrinking share of the worldwide total.
The international flavor of merger activity will almost surely be
even more prominent in the next wave, whenever that may be. By then,
I expect, it will no longer make sense to talk about U.S. merger waves at
all. Instead, we will come to see the current wave as the first interna-
tional merger wave, and its predecessor (the fourth wave) as the last
distinctly U.S. merger wave.
B. Data on International Takeover Activity
These broad claims need to be supported with data. Figure 1 shows
the percentage of worldwide, announced acquisitions that involved at
least one U.S. party and also the percentage that involved two U.S. par-
ties, from 1985 through 1999. I could not find good worldwide data
before 1985. 3
The broad trend is clear. Measured by dollar value, takeovers
involving at least one U.S. party have declined from 88% of the world-
wide total in 1985 to 53% last year. The drop in U.S.-only takeovers is
even sharper - from 83% in 1985 to 41% last year. Conversely, cross-
border takeovers, involving one U.S. party but not two, have jumped
from 6% of the one U.S.-party total in 1985 to 23% in 1999.
Data on takeover activity measured by number of transactions,
rather than dollar value, tells a similar story. U.S.-only takeovers rose
from 2600 in 1985 to 11,400 in 1999. Despite this rapid growth, U.S.-
only takeovers shrank over this period from 72% of the world total in
1985 to only 30% in 1999. To be sure, the U.S. percentage of world
takeovers by transaction value is still marginally higher than in 1990-
1991. But those years were the bottom of the trough following the
fourth U.S. wave, while 1999 is a boom year.
If U.S. takeovers are a declining share of the world total, then take-
overs elsewhere must be increasing. Figure 2 shows where the increase
is concentrated - in Europe. Takeovers involving at least one Euro-
pean party have grown from 11% of the world total in 1985 to 47% in
1999, measured by transaction value. European takeovers are running at
a high pace in 2000 as well, as the common Euro-zone currency fuels
3. Appendix I contains the data underlying the figures in text, as well as data and
corresponding figures for takeover activity measured by number of transactions.
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FIGURE 1. VALUE OF U.S. ACQUISITIONS, AS A PERCENTAGE OF
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consolidation within Europe across a broad range of industries.4
U.S. and European takeovers still dominate the world totals. But
Asia is growing rapidly, from a paltry 1% of the world total in 1985 to
6% of a much larger total in 1999, measured by transaction value, and
14% of the world total measured by number of transactions. Asian take-
overs have grown 70-fold in dollar value over this period, from $4 bil-
lion in 1985 to $281 billion in 1999.
The growth in Asian takeovers is highly likely to continue. Future
growth in Asian takeovers will be fueled by a combination of: rapid
economic growth in the region; ongoing liberalization of capital markets
in most of the major Asian economies; and the transition from control
by first-generation founders, for whom selling one's company was often
unthinkable, to professional managers who may flounder, forcing a sale,
coupled with block ownership by a family that has weaker emotional
ties to the firm and may want to sell for financial reasons.
C. U.S. and World Stock Market Growth
I claimed above that the decline in the U.S. share of world take-
4. For an overview of recent European takeover activity, see Mariage a la Mode,
ECONOMIST, Apr. 29, 2000, at 8.
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FIGURE 2. VALUE OF EUROPEAN AcQuISITIONS, AS A PERCENTAGE OF
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overs reflects a decline in the U.S. share of world stock market capitali-
zation. That claim also deserves support. Figure 4 reports the market
capitalization, in billions of 1998 U.S. dollars, of:
(i) the major American stock exchanges (American, NASDAQ, New
York);
(ii) the major European stock exchanges (Amsterdam, Athens, Barce-
lona, Brussels, Budapest, Copenhagen, Frankfurt, Helsinki, Italy, Lis-
bon, London, Luxembourg, Madrid, Oslo, Paris, Prague, Stockholm,
Switzerland, Vienna, Warsaw);
(iii) the major Asian exchanges (Hong Kong, Jakarta, Korea, Kuala
Lumpur, Mumbai, Philippines, Singapore, Taipei, Thailand, Tokyo); and
(iv) all major world exchanges combined.
This data is reported at the end of each year from 1975 through 1998.
To avoid counting the same company twice, we count for each market
the capitalization of domestic listed companies, and exclude foreign
companies (most of which are also listed on an exchange in their home
country).5
U.S. stock market capitalization grows substantially over this
5. The data underlying Figures 4 and 5 is reported in Appendix II. Separate data on
domestic and total market capitalization was not available for all markets for all years. When
separate data was not available, we used total stock market capitalization.
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FIGURE 3. VALUE OF ASIAN ACQUISITIONS, AS A PERCENTAGE OF
VALUE OF WORLDWIDE ACQUISITIONS
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period, from $2.2 trillion in 1975 to $9.9 trillion in 1998. Even so, this
growth is slower than in Europe, which expands from $1.0 trillion to
$6.7 trillion in stock market capitalization over this period.
Asian stock market capitalization also grows faster than the United
States over the entire period, from $0.7 trillion in 1975 to $3.5 trillion in
1998. But Asia shows two distinct periods: rapid growth from 1975
through 1989, when Asian market capitalization, dominated by the
Tokyo Stock Exchange, peaks at $6.6 trillion, followed by a decline to
the current level, driven by the collapse of Japanese stock prices after
1989 and, more recently, by the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis.
Figure 5 translates the dollar capitalization data in Figure 4 into
percentages of the world total. The U.S. has dropped from 60% in 1976
to 42% in 1999. Conversely, Europe has grown from 19% in 1976 to
33% in 1999. Asian market capitalization grew from 17% in 1976 to
43% in 1989, but has collapsed since to 15% in 1998. Other markets
have grown from 4% in 1976 to 11% in 1997, before retreating to 9% in
1998.6
6. I use 1976 as the base year for the comparisons in text, even though data for 1975 was
available, because U.S. percentages in 1975 were much lower than in 1976 and 1977, due to the
severe 1974-75 U.S. bear market.
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FIGURE 5. DOMESTIC STOCK MARKET CAPITALIZATION, AS
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D. Takeover Activity Relative to Market Capitalization
The final step is to relate takeover activity to market capitalization.
Figure 6 reports the level of U.S., European and Asian takeover activity,
as a percentage of year-end U.S. market capitalization, from 1985
through 1998.
Figure 6 shows the substantial rise from 1985 through 1998 in
European and Asian takeover activity, as a percentage of market capital-
ization. By this measure, the United States is still the most takeover-
intensive region, but Europe is catching up. This would be even more
apparent if Figure 6 included 1999, which is not shown because we had
market capitalization data only through 1998. Asia is also rising from a
very low base.
II. THE POLITICAL AND CULTURAL CLIMATE FOR TAKEOVERS
In the lead article for this conference, Joseph Flom discusses some
factors that make the political climate friendly to takeovers.7 I offer
below my own, partly overlapping list of factors. A caveat: This Article
7. Flom, supra note 1, at 774-75.
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FIGURE 6. REGIONAL TAKEOVER ACTIVITY AS PERCENTAGE OF
REGIONAL MARKET CAPITALIZATION
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is long on assertions, and short on citations to the data that support the
assertions. Much of the support can be found in Ronald Gilson's and
my book, The Law and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions.'
1. Low unemployment: Takeovers can produce layoffs. In the
United States, however, labor complaints about layoffs are muted, and
hard to take seriously when made, when we have a 4% unemployment
rate. An underlying macroeconomic problem is that our unemployment
rate may be unsustainably low. Most people understand that anyone
who is willing to show up for work, on time and sober, can get a job,
even if it is not always a great job.
2. Many takeovers are in sectors with weak unions and strong job
opportunities: A high proportion of the takeovers are occurring in the
new economy of technology and communications, where labor unions
are weak, growth is strong so layoffs are smaller, and employees who
are displaced have strong job prospects, because the industry as a whole
is growing.
3. Golden parachutes and stock options: Top U.S. managers now
own enough stock and stock options to mute their resistance to take-
overs. They will get rich if their company is acquired, so they do not
fight as often, as hard, or as loudly, even if they are likely to lose their
jobs in the process, as indeed they are. The trend toward generous,
8. See GILSON & BLACK, supra note 2.
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stock-based compensation of top executives is spreading worldwide.
For example, Germany recently changed its rules to permit stock-option
compensation; perhaps France will be next.
4. Breakdown of the, old antitakeover coalition: The U.S. antitake-
over coalition of the 1980's consisted of managers and labor, both
scared about losing their jobs, opposing hostile takeovers. Empirical
research shows that friendly takeovers have just as large an effect on
employment as hostile deals. Friendly deals, however, were never seri-
ously restricted because only labor opposed them, and labor by itself
lacked the political strength to persuade state legislatures to build strong
barriers.
Today, neither side of that old antitakeover coalition opposes take-
overs as vigorously, for the reasons suggested above. When they do
fight a particular bid, state legislatures sometimes side with the bidder
and reject the target's proposed antitakeover law. In the 1980's, targets
uniformly won these battles.
It helps that labor's concerns were never that strong - there is
little evidence that takeovers produce significant layoffs on the shop
floor. They do cause layoffs at the target's headquarters, but that is
where stock options are especially prevalent and likely to mute
opposition.
5. Similar trends in Europe: We can see similar trends in Europe,
albeit weaker. Unemployment concerns are higher in Europe, because
unemployment rates are much higher. Labor unions are stronger, albeit
weakening there too. Strong European unions can and do chill takeovers
in shrinking industries. In growing industries, however, workers' con-
cern for their jobs is muted and that is important to the success of take-
over bids.
Consider the Vodafone hostile takeover of Mannesmann, for an
astonishing $180 billion in Vodafone stock. A socialist German govern-
ment was eerily silent. Why? Partly because Mannesmann's workers
weren't screaming. They were quiet for good reason - this was a
merger for growth, not for consolidation, and even if they were laid off,
other telecom companies would need their skills.9
We still see proposed cross-border bids that fail because the target's
government blocks the transaction, to stop a major company from falling
into foreign hands. France and Spain are the worst offenders. But they
have become the exceptions to a more liberal general rule.
6. Hostile takeovers are not too hard legally: Under U.S. law as a
9. On the Vodafone-Mannesmann transaction, see Bidding for the Future, ECONOMIST, Feb.
12, 2000, at 71.
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whole, hostile takeover bids are hard, but not ridiculously so. Hostile
bids occasionally get made and, when made, they succeed a decent per-
centage of the time. Perhaps more importantly, the threat of a hostile
bid must be taken seriously. The target's board may have the right (the
definitive Delaware case has not been decided) to sit behind a staggered
board and a poison pill and make an acquirer win two consecutive proxy
contests to acquire control. In practice, however, few boards behave this
way. The only two cases of such behavior are Moore's bid for Wallace
(abandoned when Wallace's stock price rose through the bid price) and
U.S. Surgical's bid for Circon (abandoned when Tyco acquired U.S.
Surgical).)1
The lack of a legislative or judicial move toward stronger defenses
mirrors public unconcern about takeovers. If anything, recent Delaware
Supreme Court decisions point in the opposite direction (see part I of
this Article).
Outside the United States, hostile takeovers have long been com-
mon in Great Britain, and are increasingly viewed as politically feasible
in other European countries. In much of Europe, we increasingly realize
that purely legal barriers were never that strong. The barriers, now fall-
ing, were mostly political. The European Union is reportedly close to
adopting a takeovers directive (the Thirteenth Company Law Directive)
that is loosely patterned on the takeover-friendly British rules."1
7. Tolerable taxes on income from capital: The globalization of
capital markets makes it harder for countries to levy heavy taxes on
income from capital, lest the capital simply move elsewhere. Gradually,
this hard truth is affecting tax rates. Taxes on income from capital are
dropping in the countries where they had been highest. This smooths
the path for takeovers by reducing their tax cost.
8. Globalization: The huge scale of many recent takeovers reflects
the decades-long growth in international trade as a percentage of GDP in
almost every country, and the parallel trend towards competition becom-
ing global, not just national. Many mergers are intended to achieve
world-scale or to consolidate a worldwide, not just a national industry.
9. Low Inflation: Inflation rates in the developed world peaked in
1979-81 and have been generally dropping since. This trend is not
likely to reverse anytime soon, given the swift punishment that interna-
tional investors impose on an errant government through higher borrow-
10. For the related litigation, see Moore Corp. v. Wallace Computer Servs., 907 F. Supp.
1545 (1995); In re Circon Corp. Shareholders Litig., No. CIV. A. 15223 1998 WL 409166 (Del.
Ch. July 6, 1998).
11. See EDDY WYMEERSCH, THE ANTI-OPA DEFENSES AFTER THE THIRTEENTH DREcTIVE
(Financial Law Inst. Working Paper No. 2000-01, 2000).
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ing rates. Since most debt pays interest at a nominal (rather than real)
rate, lower inflation means lower interest rates, which let acquiring com-
panies pay higher prices and to be more patient in waiting for an acquisi-
tion's hoped-for synergies to emerge. Lower nominal interest rates also
seem to correlate with higher stock prices - leaving aside theoretical
quibbles about whether they ought to.
10. The connection between stock markets and prosperity: Most of
the U.S. population understands, more or less, the connection between
the soaring stock market and overall prosperity; as well as the connec-
tion between stock market gains and overall prosperity on the one hand,
and large government surpluses on the other hand, when only a few
years ago we expected large deficits. Most people also understand that
takeover activity, and the expectation of more, is an important driver of
stock prices.
11. Less fear of concentrated wealth: Perhaps because so much
telecoms and technology wealth is new, one doesn't sense the public
distrust of bigness and concentrated wealth that, as recently as a genera-
tion ago motivated antitrust attacks in the United States on big mergers
or political attacks on strong banks. Bill Gates is still more hero than
villain, despite having accumulated unseemly amounts of both wealth
and power. I do not even know if concentration of economic power is
rising or falling. No one is publicizing that data, though someone,
somewhere, must be studying it.
12. The ascendancy of market economics: Every thinking person
understands, and most politicians at least crudely understand, that capi-
talism has triumphed over socialism - that governments cannot
micromanage economies or run businesses. This understanding has
fueled a worldwide privatization and deregulation trend. Those regula-
tory changes directly fuel takeover activity in particular industries,
including banking, airlines, and telecoms. The broad trend toward capi-
talism as the dominant market paradigm also contributes to a political
mindset that government shouldn't interfere too much with large take-
overs either - that the market knows best.
13. Startups meant to be bought: Some startup companies are
begun with the hope of growing big. But a surprising number are begun
by entrepreneurs who understand that the eventual exit is a takeover by a
major player. That exit might be before an initial public offering or after
it, but both the entrepreneurs and the venture capitalists who fund them
plan explicitly for that exit.
Telecom and Internet equipment offers a good example. Build a
nice piece of hardware or software that solves a current need, and
Lucent or Cisco or Nortel will come knocking at your door, offering a
[Vol. 54:799
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handsome exit price for a one-product company that could never survive
on its own and was never meant to.
14. The growing importance of time-to-market: In the high-tech
industries that form a large part of overall market capitalization, time-to-
market is critical. The traditional buy-versus-build choice is often no
choice at all, if it would take a year to build what you could buy next
week. The only questions are price and whom you buy (if there is a
choice) to fill a hole in your product line. For example, Intel and
Microsoft each make dozens of acquisitions per year to fill holes in their
product lines. Those acquisitions are small for them, but sometimes
involve a nine or even a ten-digit payoff for the target.
III. WE STILL NEED HOSTILE TAKEOVERS
Hostile takeovers are a modest percentage of overall takeover activ-
ity. Yet they remain a lightning rod for public criticism of takeover
activity generally, even if that criticism is not as loud today as in the
1980's. In my judgment, takeover bids remain an important safety
valve. Most boards of directors act in shareholders' interests, but a
minority is willing to part with astonishing amounts of shareholder
money in a quest for continued independence, or for a combination with
preferred bidder A instead of interloper B.
As long as that minority exists, there remains a role for hostile take-
overs. As long as we have boards of directors like Warner-Lambert's,
that try desperately to hold onto a friendly deal when another bidder is
willing to pay more (American Home Products was an equally plausible
partner who was offering an extra $15 billion to shareholders), we need
a way for a bidder to take its case directly to the target's shareholders.12
So too with Vodafone's acquisition of Mannesmann. The business
combination made lots of sense. Whether Vodafone bought Mannes-
mann or vice versa mattered to their respective chairmen, but probably
did not much affect the efficiency gains from the combination. Both
companies were well-run, and they are likely worth more together than
apart. But when Mannesmann resisted, Vodafone needed a way to bring
its offer directly to the Mannesmann shareholders.
I doubt that we need many hostile takeovers, as long as the threat of
12. When I presented this Article, a lawyer for one of the parties to this takeover battle
commented afterward that Warner-Lambert may have resisted partly for tactical reasons - to get
a higher price from American Home Products. That's plausible, but such a tactical decision must
be placed in the context of takeover rules that block preclusive lockups. With a preclusive lockup
not available, American Home Products was willing to make a superior bid, after which everyone
understood that the lower-valued Pfizer deal was dead because Warner-Lambert's shareholders
wouldn't vote for it. It is anyone's guess what Warner-Lambert's board would have done if a
preclusive lockup with Pfizer was permitted.
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one can help to bring managers to the negotiating table, as happens
today in a nontrivial but unknowable number of cases. But we need
some hostile offers. So, I am delighted that there is no trend to making
hostile bids even harder, and that they are possible in most countries.
Increasingly, managers seem to accept that there should be some
role for hostile takeovers. There is no move away from Delaware,
which recently banned dead-hand poison pills, to other states that allow
them. Indeed, the Delaware Supreme Court's dead-hand pill decision in
Quickturn Design Systems v. Mentor Graphics Corp, 3 before that, its
cap on lockups in Paramount Communications v. QVC Networks,14 and
more generally, its backtracking in QVC and other cases from the 1990
pro-defense highwater mark of Paramount Communications v. Time
Inc., 5 were possible, without a backlash from managers, partly because
of a general social sense that takeover defenses are strong enough and
should not be bulletproof. So too with the recent Delaware Chancery
Court decisions that suggest that the target's board can't bind itself too
tightly not to talk to another potential bidder.
1 6
I do not want to suggest that the Delaware Supreme Court consults
only the political tea leaves in deciding cases. But only the naive would
fail to understand that the Delaware courts are politically sensitive
institutions. 17
IV. CONCLUSION: TAKEOVERS ARE MOSTLY GOOD FOR SOCIETY
A good way to close this Article may be to reaffirm that takeovers
are mostly good for society. Intensive empirical study over the last
twenty years has taught us a lot about the net social benefits of take-
overs. If, as is usually the case, the bidder's and the target's shares
together are worth more than before the bid was announced, that is evi-
dence of a net social gain and a crude measure of the amount of the gain.
I am more skeptical than most academics about the benefits of
many takeovers to the acquiring firm. My first professional article was
13. 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1999).
14. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
15. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
16. See ACE Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95 (Del. Ch. 1999) (refusing to enforce no-
talk provision in merger agreement against target's board); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax
Minerals, No. CIV. A. 17398, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 202, (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 1999) (expressing
doubts about validity of no-talk provision); In re IXC Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litig.,
No. CIV. A. 17334, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 210, (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 1999) (suggesting some
remaining validity for no-talk clauses).
17. For an argument that manager and public opposition to hostile takeovers may have
contributed to the Paramount-Time decision, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and
Courts, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1931 (1991).
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titled Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers 8 and there continues to be evi-
dence that overpayment is distressingly common.' 9 In a world of partial
anticipation of bids, on both the bidder and target side, it is hard to
untangle how much of the net stock price gains from takeovers reflect
investor anticipation of future cash flow gains. There is compelling evi-
dence, however, that a significant amount of the net shareholder gains
- mostly on the target's side - does reflect investor expectation of a
net wealth gain. The apparent percentage gains are smaller in the stock-
for-stock deals that predominate today, but the evidence for significant
net gains is still strong.
Wealth transfers from others cannot explain much of the net gains
to shareholders. Surely, as Joseph Flom suggests in his article for this
conference, shareholder gains should be measured after tax. But social
gains include the taxes that the shareholders pay. The distinction he
draws between gains to different classes of shareholders - long-term
versus short-term, and within short-term holders, between arbitrageurs
and others - seem nonsensical to me. Maybe a practicing lawyer still
needs to cover his tracks. Maybe Flom needs to claim that there is a
defensible case to be made for a burn-all-bridges defense, as long as
there are some clients who want to hire Skadden Arps to mount such a
defense.
Academics, however, do not have to worry about such things. So I
want to close by stating my own position: there are many bad takeovers
that should not happen at all and are motivated by the empire-building
instincts of the acquirer's CEO. There are many good combinations,
where 100% or more of the net gains go to the target's shareholders,
because the acquirer has paid too much. And there are many wonderful
takeovers that create huge amounts of value for both the acquirer's and
the target's shareholders. On average, there is a lot of value creation.
Short-term stock price studies show that. Long-term studies con-
firm that the short-term reactions are decent estimates of the long-term
outcomes. I wish I knew a good way to cut down on the bad takeovers
while preserving the good ones. I do not. The friendly/hostile distinc-
tion certainly does not distinguish good takeovers from bad. If anything,
the evidence suggests that the average hostile deal is more likely than
the average friendly deal to create value. So, we have to take the good
with the bad.
18. Bernard Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REv. 597 (1989).
19. See, e.g., MARK SIROWER, THE SYNERGY TRAP: How COMPANIES LOSE THE AcQuIsrrlON
GAME (1997).
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APPENDIX I: DATA ON WORLDWIDE TAKEOVERS, 1985-1999
All data reported below is from Securities Data Company and is based
on announced transactions, not all of which were completed. Transac-
tion value reflects only transactions where a transaction amount was
available, and includes the target's net debt. Percentages are of the
world total. Dollar amounts are in millions of U.S. dollars.























































































































































































2000] THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL MERGER WAVE
Number of Transactions
Year U.S. only World Percent Europe only Percent Asia only Percent
1985 2567 3559 72.1% 263 7.4% 29 0.8%
1986 3529 5248 67.2 554 10.6 56 1.1
1987 4228 7028 60.2 1323 18.8 84 1.2
1988 4296 9575 44.9 2851 29.8 156 1.6
1989 6046 13395 45.1 3614 27.0 316 2.4
1990 6235 14899 41.8 3499 23.5 546 3.7
1991 5500 20933 26.3 7725 36.9 1088 5.2
1992 6042 19895 30.4 7826 39.3 685 3.4
1993 6901 20737 33.3 6855 33.1 1073 5.2
1994 8293 23201 35.7 7340 31.6 1385 6.0
1995 9878 27633 35.7 8279 30.0 2095 7.6
1996 11368 29260 38.9 7329 25.0 2520 8.6
1997 11892 29431 40.4 7217 24.5 2407 8.2
1998 13463 34059 39.5 8369 24.6 2395 7.0
1999 11436 37671 30.4 12203 32.4 3731 9.9
One One
One U.S. European Asian
Year party World Percent party Percent party Percent
1985 3062 3559 86.0% 532 14.9% 84 2.4%
1986 4311 5248 82.1 955 18.2 162 3.1
1987 5092 7028 72.5 1903 27.1 194 2.8
1988 5654 9575 59.0 3851 40.2 373 3.9
1989 7966 13395 59.5 5052 37.7 624 4.7
1990 8274 14899 55.5 5827 39.1 981 6.6
1991 7454 20933 35.6 11210 53.6 1485 7.1
1992 7693 19895 38.7 10688 53.7 937 4.7
1993 8725 20737 42.1 9492 45.8 1458 7.0
1994 10534 23201 45.4 9795 42.2 1903 8.2
1995 12466 27633 45.1 11340 41.0 2672 9.7
1996 14212 29260 48.6 10390 35.5 3228 11.0
1997 14952 29431 50.8 9953 33.8 2985 10.1
1998 17120 34059 50.3 11643 34.2 3411 10.0
1999 15122 37671 40.1 16162 42.9 5132 13.6
The data on transaction value is reported in the text in graphical
form. The parallel data based on number of transactions for the United
States, Europe and Asia, is reported in Figures A-1, A-2, and A-3 below.
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-- 4-- At least one U.S. party (target or acquirer)
-- 0 - -Two U.S. parties
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Source: Securities Data Co. (based on announced transactions, value Includes target's net debt)












10.0% --- At least one European party (target or acquirer)
5.0% - - -Two European parties
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Source: Securities Data Co. (based on announced transactions, value Includes target's net debt)
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-4-At least one Asian party (target or acquirer)
-Ud-Two Asian parties
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APPENDIX II: DATA ON WORLD STOCK MARKET CAPITALIZATION,
1975-1998
All data reported below is for total market capitalization at the end of the
indicated years, and is reported in billions of 1998 U.S. dollars. Data is
based on domestic capitalization for each market where available, and
on total market capitalization when separate domestic capitalization is
not available. Data is from WORLD STOCK EXCHANGE FACT BOOK 1999
(Meridian Securities Markets).
U.S. markets are: American, NASD, New York.
European markets are: Amsterdam, Athens, Barcelona, Brussels,
Budapest, Copenhagen, Frankfurt, Helsinki, Italy, Lisbon, London, Lux-
embourg, Madrid, Oslo, Paris, Prague, Stockholm, Switzerland, Vienna
and Warsaw.
Asian markets are: Hong Kong, Jakarta, Korea, Kuala Lumpur,
Mumbai, Philippines, Singapore, Taipei, Thailand and Tokyo.
Other major stock markets are: Australia, Bogota, Buenos Aires,
Caracas, Istanbul, Johannesburg, Mexico, Montreal, New Zealand, Rio
de Janeiro, Santiago, Sao Paolo, Tel Aviv and Toronto.
Year-End Stock Market Capitalization
Year U.S. World Percent Europe Percent Asia Percent Other Percent
1975 2166 4127 52.48% 1040 25.19% 712 17.26% 200 4.83%
1976 2783 4671 59.59 869 18.61 799 17.11 196 4.19
1977 2438 4244 57.46 880 20.73 725 17.08 201 4.74
1978 2352 4389 53.58 896 20.42 891 20.29 234 5.34
1979 2495 4643 53.75 852 18.35 900 19.39 362 7.79
1980 2864 5156 55.55 901 17.48 935 18.14 436 8.45
1981 2390 4704 50.80 879 18.69 1053 22.39 369 7.84
1982 2570 5075 50.63 911 17.95 1098 21.63 491 9.68
1983 3099 6240 49.66 1185 18.99 1392 22.30 558 8.93
1984 2923 6615 44.19 1381 20.88 1721 26.02 583 8.81
1985 3386 7880 42.97 1855 23.54 2065 26.21 565 7.17
1986 3783 10284 36.79 2450 23.82 3142 30.55 892 8.68
1987 3634 10442 34.81 2278 21.81 3666 35.11 836 8.01
1988 3845 12707 30.26 2741 21.57 5241 41.25 857 6.75
1989 4457 15358 29.02 3436 22.37 6641 43.24 785 5.11
1990 3832 11496 33.33 2724 23.70 4115 35.80 773 6.72
1991 4882 12986 37.59 2952 22.73 4075 31.38 969 7.46
1992 5209 12649 41.18 2987 23.61 3393 26.83 930 7.35
1993 5836 15754 37.05 4008 25.44 4316 27.39 1423 9.03
1994 5481 15587 35.17 3849 24.69 4485 28.78 1606 10.31
1995 7334 17890 40.99 4229 23.64 4598 25.70 1596 8.92
1996 6827 18557 36.79 5063 27.28 4580 24.68 1968 10.61
1997 8597 21418 40.14 6716 31.36 3684 17.20 2273 10.61
1998 9921 23410 42.38 7802 33.33 3467 14.81 2127 9.08
